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Abstract
Machine learning models are usually evaluated according to
the average case performance on the test set. However, this
is not always ideal, because in some sensitive domains (e.g.
autonomous driving), it is the worst case performance that
matters more. In this paper, we are interested in systematic
exploration of the input data space to identify the weakness
of the model to be evaluated. We propose to use an adversar-
ial examiner in the testing stage. Different from the existing
strategy to always give the same (distribution of) test data,
the adversarial examiner will dynamically select the next test
data to hand out based on the testing history so far, with the
goal being to undermine the model’s performance. This se-
quence of test data not only helps us understand the current
model, but also serves as constructive feedback to help im-
prove the model in the next iteration. We conduct experi-
ments on ShapeNet object classification. We show that our
adversarial examiner can successfully put more emphasis on
the weakness of the model, preventing performance estimates
from being overly optimistic.
1 Introduction
The field of machine learning is advancing at unprecedented
speed, and one evidence often cited is the reported perfor-
mance on benchmark datasets. There are usually leader-
boards for these public datasets with specific evaluation met-
rics, and the entry that achieves the highest number is re-
garded as the state-of-the-art. In several cases, it is claimed
that the machine learning model has surpassed human-level
performance using this criterion (He et al. 2015; Wang, Yan,
and Wu 2018).
However, the common belief is that humans are still supe-
rior, which suggests that the current testing strategy is overly
optimistic and does not reflect the true progress in advancing
machine learning. We think an important reason behind this
mismatch is that: the current evaluation protocol uses fixed
test data and measures the average case performance, which
does not place enough emphasis on the worst case perfor-
mance. To make this point concrete, imagine a model for au-
tonomous driving. Suppose that in the testing data, there are
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1 million images under normal conditions (in which case the
car should keep driving), and 1 image with a baby in front
(in which case the car should immediately stop). Under the
current evaluation protocol, a policy to always keep driving
and give up on the rare case will be highly regarded. How-
ever, from the humans’ perspective, this strategy is clearly
problematic and alarming. Therefore, at least in some sensi-
tive domains, placing more emphasis on the worst cases to
reveal model weaknesses may be more important than sim-
ply relying on the average case.
Revealing model weaknesses by densely sampling the in-
put data space is clearly impractical. This is because any
input data point is usually determined by a combination of
factors, which makes the space exponentially large. For ex-
ample, an image is jointly determined by the rotation an-
gles of the objects, the positions of the objects, the material
properties, the type of lighting, the energy of lighting, the
distance to camera, etc. Larger test set certainly helps, but
no matter how large it gets, it will never be able to densely
cover this exponentially large space. Therefore our goal is to
efficiently and systematically identify the model weaknesses
within a reasonable number of queries.
Different models have different weaknesses, so it no
longer makes sense to have a fixed test set, rather a dynamic
one. In some way, this notion of fixed versus dynamic is
very similar to giving standardized tests versus conducting
interviews. In standardized tests, the questions are usually
designed to have general coverage, since all test takers an-
swer the same questions. In interviews, the examiner may
start with general topics, but also has the freedom to deep
dive into specific ones to challenge the candidate. We also
point out that this notion of dynamic examiner is closer in
spirit to Turing test. If the human evaluator in Turing test al-
ways asks the same questions, then its role can be replaced
by a machine. It is also conceivable that the worst answer
during the exchange will contribute most to the human eval-
uator’s final judgment.
Formalizing the ideas discussed above, we propose adver-
sarial examiner, an alternative way of evaluating a model.
Provided with a model and the space of input data, the adver-
sarial examiner will dynamically select the next test data to
hand out, based on the testing history so far. The name “ad-
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Figure 1: Evaluating a model’s ability to recognize a lamp instance in ShapeNet. If we randomly sample data, the evaluation
will converge to a high percentage (around 80%). However, using our Adversarial Examiner (AE), the test cases gradually
concentrate on the weaknesses of the model, and the evaluation will not be overly optimistic. In this example, AE has found
that the model appears to be vulnerable to increased lighting (within a reasonable range).
versarial” comes from the fact that its goal is to minimize the
model’s performance. Compared with the standard testing
protocol, adversarial examiner obviously places more em-
phasis on the worst case scenarios. Because of its depen-
dence on testing history, the sequence of test data naturally
reveals the process of identifying model weakness. Fig. 1
offers a demonstration.
Adversarial attack is also a way of showing the weakness
of the model. The message of adversarial attack is that for a
particular data point, there exists another data point within
its local neighborhood, such that the model fails. However,
both the original data point and the local neighborhood are
microscopic properties. By contrast, our adversarial exam-
iner starts with the entire input data space, and therefore
has the potential of revealing the global picture. In addition,
since the adversarial examiner concerns the global struc-
ture, the testing results are more informative and more easily
perceived as “constructive feedback” that help improve the
model in the next iteration.
We conduct experiments on ShapeNet object classifica-
tion. The input data space is the Cartesian product of 12
physical parameters that determine the scene, including the
rotation and position of object, the energy and angle of light-
ing, etc. Through both quantitative evaluation and qualita-
tive visualization, we show that our adversarial examiner can
successfully identify the weakness of the model, preventing
performance estimates from being overly optimistic.
2 Method
2.1 Adversarial Examiner
We begin by revisiting the evaluation protocol employed in
a standard classification task. The examples x ∈ Rp follow
an underlying distribution P . The ground truth label of x is
y(x) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. The label predicted by the model f is
f(x) ∈ Rk. Given a loss function L(·, ·) that measures the
compatibility between f(x) and y(x), the evaluation metric
is:
E = Ex∼P [L(f(x), y(x))] ≈ 1
N
N∑
i=1
L(f(xi), y(xi)) (1)
where xi ∼ P .
In applications such as computer vision and natural lan-
guage processing, the examples x are usually the surface
representation, e.g. 2D images in vision and words in lan-
guage. However, there is typically an underlying representa-
tion z that generates/determines this surface representation
x. In vision, z would be the 3D object instance. In language,
z would be the semantics/pragmatics that the speaker wishes
to communicate. In the following, we consider evaluation on
the underlying representation z, which is more intrinsic.
The examples z ∈ Rq follow an underlying distribution
Q, whose support is D. If we can obtain the ground truth
label using the surface form x, then we can certainly obtain
it using the underlying form z. We slightly abuse annota-
tion and use y(z) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} to represent the ground
truth label for instance z. Let g be the function that trans-
forms the underlying form into surface form x = g(z, s),
where s ∈ S represents the remaining information needed
to complete this transformation. For example, in vision, s
could include camera information, lighting condition, etc.
In language, s may be a tie-breaker between synonyms or
sentence templates that express the same meaning.
We use the following evaluation metric in our adversarial
examiner:
Eexaminer = Ez∼Q[max
s∈S
L(f(g(z, s)), y(z))]
≈ 1
N
N∑
i=1
max
si∈S
L(f(g(zi, si)), y(zi))
(2)
where zi ∼ Q. We choose S such that for any instance z ∈
D and any s ∈ S, the surface form g(z, s) still preserves the
label y(z) as judged by humans. The max in (2) means the
examiner will consider the worst case within the space S,
which differs from (1).
It is easy to see that
Eexaminer ≤ max
z∈D,s∈S
L(f(g(z, s)), y(z)) = L(f(g(zˆ, sˆ)), y(zˆ))
(3)
where (zˆ, sˆ) is the worst case scenario. We now discuss a
special case, where the space S is so rich, that ∀zi, zj ∈ D,
∃si, sj ∈ S , such that g(zi, si) = g(zj , sj). In this case, the
worst combination (zˆ, sˆ) can always be achieved from any
Algorithm 1: Adversarial Examiner Procedure
Input: N samples zi ∼ Q and their true labels y(zi);
Maximum number of examination steps T ; Loss
function L; Model f ; Function g; Space S.
1 for i = 1 to N do
2 Initialize examiner with S
3 for t = 1 to T do
4 sti = examiner.generate()
5 lti = L(f(g(zi, s
t
i)), y(zi))
6 examiner.update(sti, l
t
i)
7 return Eexaminer = 1N
∑N
i=1 l
T
i
sample zi. Therefore, Eexaminer will return exactly the worst
case performance under model f , which is what we expect
and desire.
Implementing the adversarial examiner according to (2)
requires solving an optimization problem for every instance
zi. Since the landscape of f(g(zi, ·)) on S can be arbi-
trary, we address the general case by assuming no closed-
form solution and no differentiability. We consider a se-
quential strategy, where the adversarial examiner will hand
out new candidates of sti based on the testing history so far
s1i , s
2
i , . . . , s
t−1
i . See Algorithm 1 for the adversarial exam-
iner procedure.
Relation to Adversarial Attacks We named our examiner
“adversarial” to acknowledge its connection to adversarial
attacks. If we conduct adversarial attacks on the samples xi
before evaluating using (1), the result is:
Eattack ≈ 1
N
N∑
i=1
max
δi∈∆
L(f(xi + δi), y(xi)) (4)
There are at least two key differences between adversar-
ial attack (AA) and adversarial examination (AE). First, AE
deals with the underlying form whereas AA deals with the
surface form. As a result, the variations considered by AE
on the surface form is much larger than ∆. Second and
more importantly, in AA there is a “canonical” starting point
δi = 0, so essentially all attack algorithms perform gradi-
ent descent starting from δi = 0. As a result, the sequence
δ1i , δ
2
i , . . . is usually very local. In AE, there is typically no
“canonical” choice for si, so AE is forced to start with the
entire space S instead of a specific point. As a result, the se-
quence s1i , s
2
i , . . . exhibits large variations. This global pic-
ture reveals different properties of f than AA, and is po-
tentially more useful in representing the weakness (and/or
strength) of the model.
Availability of Underlying Representation While data in
the surface form are straightforward to collect, there may
be concerns whether it is always easy to obtain the un-
derlying representation z considered by the adversarial ex-
aminer. We argue that this problem has been greatly alle-
viated in recent years, with either rich annotation on real
data (Xiang, Mottaghi, and Savarese 2014; Krishna et al.
2017), or increasing use of synthetic data (Chang et al. 2015;
Johnson et al. 2017), or a hybrid between real and synthetic
(Gaidon et al. 2016; Hudson and Manning 2019). In addi-
tion, in related topics such as image caption evaluation, the
advantage of evaluating the underlying representation (e.g.
SPICE (Anderson et al. 2016)) over the surface represen-
tation (e.g. BLEU (Papineni et al. 2002)) has been demon-
strated.
2.2 Model Choices for Examiner
We describe two classes of models as the examiner in Al-
gorithm 1. One is based on Reinforcement Learning (Sec-
tion 2.2), and the other is based on Bayesian Optimization
(Section 2.2). We conclude by discussing how these two
classes of models are complementary (Section 2.2), which
shows the general applicability of our adversarial examiner
framework.
Reinforcement Learning as Examiner Let space S be
the Cartesian product of C factors S = Ψ1 × Ψ2 ×
· · · × ΨC , where Ψi represents the parameter range of
the i-th factor. Therefore, the candidate sti is composed of
ψ1(i,t), ψ
2
(i,t), . . . , ψ
C
(i,t), where ψ
c
(i,t) ∈ Ψc. The probabil-
ity of generating sti is P (s
t
i) =
∏C
c=1 P (ψ
c
(i,t)|ψc−1:1(i,t) ). We
use a LSTM (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber 1997) to parame-
terize these conditional probabilities. Concretely, in the first
LSTM step, the initial hidden state h1 is followed by a fully
connected layer and softmax to represent P (ψ1(i,t)). We then
draw a sample according to this distribution, which is fed
into the second LSTM step. The updated hidden state h2 is
followed by a fully connected layer and softmax to repre-
sent P (ψ2(i,t)|ψ1(i,t)). This process is repeated until we have
drawn a complete sample of C steps.
To train this LSTM using reinforcement learning, we de-
fine the reward signalR to be L(f(g(zi, sti)), y(zi)), and op-
timize the weights θ using policy gradient (Williams 1992):
∇θEP (sti;θ)[R] ≈
1
B
B∑
b=1
C∑
c=1
∇θ logP (ψc(i,t)|ψc−1:1(i,t) )Rb
(5)
where B is the batch size to reduce high variance.
Bayesian Optimization as Examiner We use Gaus-
sian Process (GP) as the model behind Bayesian opti-
mization. The value that the GP aims to maximize is
L(f(g(zi, s
t
i)), y(zi)) from Algorithm 1. The example gen-
erated by our examiner is equivalent to the point proposed by
the acquisition function a : S → R+. We use Gaussian Pro-
cess upper confidence bound (UCB) (Srinivas et al. 2009) to
construct our acquisition function.
Let W be the set of points that induce the posterior mul-
tivariate Gaussian distribution, which is initially empty. For
each iteration t = 1, 2, . . . , T , we select the next candidate
by:
sti = argmax
s∈S
a(s) (6)
where a is the acquisition function induced by the current
W . We then construct its surface form and test on the model.
This newly observed point (sti, L(f(g(zi, s
t
i)), y(zi))) is
then added to set W . In the next iteration, the examiner
will induce a new posterior multivariate Gaussian distribu-
tion based on the updated set W . By the end of adversarial
examination, the candidates {sti ∈ S}Tt=1 are the points that
induce the most up-to-date posterior multivariate Gaussian
distribution on S.
How the Two Examiners Are Complementary
Discrete vs. Continuous In RL, the choices of parameters
in Ψ are discrete as we use softmax to select amongst them.
As for BO, the ranges of parameters are typically continu-
ous as the underlying assumption is a multivariate Gaussian
distribution.
Maintaining Sampling Distribution on S vs. Maintain-
ing Function Value on S The LSTM model within RL
captures the sampling probability P on S, without explicitly
recording the function value L. On the other hand, the GP
model within BO relies on the function values (set W ) to fit
the acquisition function.
Longer Iteration Regime vs. Shorter Iteration Regime
BO can be quite sample efficient, and is potentially able to
successfully attack the model within a limited number of
steps. However, it becomes costly when the iteration gets
long. On the other hand, policy-based RL can be inefficient,
but the computation cost does not go up with more iterations.
3 Related Work
We argue that the average case performance does not always
reflect human’s level of trust in a model. The primary design
philosophy behind adversarial examiner is to place more em-
phasis on the worst case performance, which especially mat-
ters in sensitive domains. Indeed, medical imaging papers
typically report the worst performance on the test set in ad-
dition to the average performance. The idea of paying more
attention to the worst cases was recently discussed in Yuille
and Liu (2018).
As suggested by its name, adversarial examiner is related
to finding adversarial examples (Szegedy et al. 2013). They
were originally found by doing backpropagation and gradi-
ent ascent on the input image. Later researchers started to
consider the more challenging but more general scenario,
where the neural network weights are not known to the at-
tacker. This is called black box adversarial attack, where
existing methods (Narodytska and Kasiviswanathan 2016;
Chen et al. 2017; Ilyas et al. 2018) still rely on estimating the
gradient. Essentially, black box adversarial attack belongs
to derivative-free optimization, which includes many other
families of methods than gradient approximation. To the best
of our knowledge, ours is the first work that brings Rein-
forcement Learning (RL) and Bayesian Optimization (BO)
to black box adversarial attack. Our RL setup is inspired by
work on Neural Architecture Search (Zoph and Le 2017),
whereas our BO setup is inspired by work on hyperparame-
ter selection (Snoek, Larochelle, and Adams 2012). Again,
both problems are typical derivative-free optimization.
Recently, researchers have been rethinking the concept of
adversarial examples (Gilmer et al. 2018) and generalizing
them beyond modifying pixel values. (Engstrom et al. 2017;
Pei et al. 2017; Azulay and Weiss 2018) showed that deep
networks can be attacked simply by 2D rotation, translation,
or brightness change. (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio
2016; Athalye et al. 2018; Eykholt et al. 2017) demonstrated
the possibility of generating physical adversarial examples
in the real world. (Gu et al. 2019) used the minute transfor-
mations across video frames to study adversarial robustness.
(Brown et al. 2018) introduced the concept of unrestricted
adversarial examples, and (Song et al. 2018) described a
method to generate unrestricted adversarial examples using
a differentiable neural network. More related to our work,
(Zeng et al. 2019; Yang et al. 2018; Alcorn et al. 2019;
Kanezaki, Matsushita, and Nishida 2018) incorporated ren-
dering into the visual recognition pipeline to study how 3D
physical parameters may affect model prediction. However,
they were all concerned with creating adversarial examples
starting from a specific configuration, instead of considering
the global space.
Finally, there are a couple of works that used synthetic
data to iteratively improve the model, whether in the train-
ing stage or the inference stage. Chen et al. (2018) proposed
to increase the sampling probability in the underperforming
region. Misra et al. (2018) used an agent to learn to select
questions in synthetic visual question answering. Yang et
al. (2019) learned to navigate in a synthetic scene and select
better views for visual recognition. Kar et al. (2019) learned
the policy to generate synthetic scenes, whose goal is to best
facilitate downstream tasks. Our work is different, in that we
focus on a new paradigm of model evaluation, which sys-
tematically explores the input data space to identify model
weaknesses.
4 Experiments
4.1 Implementation Details
We conduct experiments on visual recognition of objects in
the ShapeNet dataset (Chang et al. 2015), which contains
αo βo ζo Γo Γl rl Al Ul rv Av Uv θv
UB 2pi 2pi 2pi 5 1 20 360 90 5 180 90 360
LB 0 0 0 0 0.3 8 0 -90 1 0 -90 0
Table 1: Upper bound (UB) and lower bound (LB) of rendering factors in s: sun rotation angles (αo, βo, ζo), sun energy
(Γo), point light energy (Γl), point light distance (rl), point light location (Al, Ul), viewpoint distance (rv), viewpoint location
(Av, Uv), viewpoint angle (θv).
Model Examiner T = 0 T = 100 T = 300 T = 500
AlexNet RL 63.98% 65.91% 18.92% 2.27%BO 60.05% 43.58% 29.98% 25.43%
ResNet34 RL 69.03% 68.58% 38.86% 13.13%BO 64.19% 54.89% 48.07% 45.55%
Table 2: Average model performance under adversarial examination. We report 2 × 2 × 4 = 16 settings under various model,
examiner, and number of iterations combinations. The values are average post-softmax probability on the true class.
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(a) RL Examiner on AlexNet
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(b) RL Examiner on ResNet34
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(c) BO Examiner on AlexNet
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(d) BO Examiner on ResNet34
Figure 2: Per-class model performance under adversarial examination. The four plots correspond to AlexNet (left) vs. ResNet34
(right), RL (upper) vs. BO (lower). Horizontal axis is object category. AlexNet is more vulnerable than ResNet34, and the RL
examiner seems more strict than BO examiner under the same T .
55 classes and 51190 instances. Here, the underlying repre-
sentation z would be the 3D object, s would be parameters
required in rendering (we consider a total of C = 12 factors,
listed in Tab. 1), and surface form x would be the 2D image
after rendering. We use the Blender software for rendering.
Our target models are ResNet34 (He et al. 2016) and
AlexNet (Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012) trained
on the 2D image surface form x. The ResNet34 model is
trained with learning rate of 0.005, and AlexNet model with
0.001, both with Adam optimizer (Kingma and Ba 2014) for
40 epochs.
During training, we randomly select a value for each of
the 12 factors, and render m = 10 images per 3D object.
During adversarial examination, we assume that the exam-
iners have no control over the location of the sun, so we ran-
domly choose the rotation angles for the sun and fix them.
The remaining 9 factors will be available to and explored by
the examiners. For each class, we choose one 3D object in
the validation set that has the highest post-softmax probabil-
ity on the true class.
In RL, the 9 continuous factors will be discretized to 100
choices evenly distributed on their respective ranges. When
sampling the factors, the choice made will be mapped to its
corresponding embedding space (embedding size 30), then
fed into LSTM (hidden state size 30). We set the learn-
ing rate to 0.001 and batch size to 32, and use Adam op-
timizer (Kingma and Ba 2014) to update model parame-
ters. In BO, our implementation is based on the Bayesian
Optimization package1 and we allow 2 random ex-
amples at the very beginning. Both examiners operate for
T = 500 iterations, and L is the negative post-softmax prob-
ability on the true class.
1https://github.com/fmfn/BayesianOptimization
(a) RL on AlexNet (b) BO on AlexNet (c) RL on ResNet34 (d) BO on ResNet34
Figure 3: t-SNE visualization of cap examples under different examiners and target models. There are 100 examples in each
subfigure: 50 randomly sampled ones, and 50 from the very end of adversarial examination. Transparent cap means correctly
classified. Otherwise, incorrectly classified.
m = 10 m = 5 m = 2 m = 1
RL 63.81% 57.43% 35.05% 18.92%
BO 49.79% 43.06% 22.19% 10.92%
Table 3: Average model performance under adversarial ex-
amination for varying m: number of training images per in-
stance. We report m = 1, 2, 5, 10 with iterations T = 200.
4.2 Evaluating Model Performance with
Adversarial Examiners
The evaluation results by our adversarial examiners are
shown in Tab. 2. For both AlexNet and ResNet34, we tried
both RL and BO examiners under different number of iter-
ations T . The T = 0 column corresponds to the standard
evaluation protocol, which on average records more than
60% probability on the true class. After a few hundred it-
erations, both examiners can find the weakness of the model
successfully. In addition, longer examination results in lower
performance, which is expected. But their characteristics are
not entirely the same. BO can find weaknesses relatively
faster (larger gap from T = 0 to T = 100), but eventu-
ally (T = 300 or T = 500) RL becomes more committed to
the weaknesses and gives a harsher evaluation.
Fig. 2 shows the per-class post-softmax probability on the
true class. We found that the weaknesses of some classes are
easier to find than others. For instance, barrel and bowl are
relatively vulnerable since they look very similar (generic
round shape) when viewing from bottom-up. Classes such
as airplane, which contain discriminative visual cues at all
angles, are more robust under adversarial examination.
Fig. 3 uses t-SNE (Maaten and Hinton 2008) to visualize
50 randomly sampled examples and 50 examples selected
at the end of adversarial examination of the cap class. Cor-
rectly classified examples are transparent, and incorrectly
classified ones are opaque. This visualization serves to show
the global distribution of model weakness on the space S.
We can observe clusters among the incorrectly classified ex-
amples, e.g. due to viewpoint or lighting.
Figure 4: t-SNE visualization of can examples. 100 are ran-
domly sampled, and 100 are from RL examiner T = 250.
Transparent can means correctly classified. Otherwise, in-
correctly classified. In this experiment, training data for
ResNet34 did not have top and bottom viewpoints. Adver-
sarial examiner is able to identify these two artificial weak-
nesses (circled in green and blue).
4.3 Examining Models Trained with Less Data
Intuitively, neural networks trained with less data should be
less robust against adversarial examiners. In this experiment,
we put this hypothesis to test. Specifically, we vary m, the
number of images rendered for each 3D object in the train-
ing set. We train ResNet34 models with m = 1, 2, 5, 10 (re-
call that m = 10 is the default) using the same number of
epochs.
Tab. 3 summarizes the results. Under the same iterations
T , both RL and BO examiners report decreased performance
as m decreases. In addition to validating the adversarial ex-
aminer framework, this also confirms the importance of the
amount and diversity of training data.
4.4 Evaluating Model with Artificial Weaknesses
To further study the properties of adversarial examiner, we
consider an artificial scenario, where we deliberately put in
obvious weaknesses. We are interested to see to what extent
59.4% 75.0% 100%
Figure 5: Identifying model strength by negating L. For this piano instance, the examiner eventually finds a condition under
which the model can correctly classify with 100% confidence.
can the adversarial examiner recover these obvious weak-
nesses. Specifically, during training, we limit the viewpoint
elevation Uv to [−30◦,+30◦] instead of [−90◦,+90◦]. This
will create two obvious weaknesses: viewing objects from
the top and from the bottom. Note that the examiner is still
allowed to change all 9 factors.
Fig. 4 shows the t-SNE visualization of 200 can exam-
ples. 100 are randomly sampled, and 100 are from T = 250
during adversarial examination. Among the incorrectly clas-
sified examples (visualized as opaque), there are two large
regions, with the bottom left representing viewing from the
bottom, and the top right representing viewing from the top.
This observation further confirms the capability of adversar-
ial examiners.
4.5 Changing the Order of Factors
As described in Section 2.2, the RL examiner samples pa-
rameters in a sequential manner. In this experiment, we in-
vestigate whether changing the sampling order of factors
will make a difference in adversarial examination.
The default RL examiner samples in the order
Γl,Γo, rl, Al, Ul, rv, Av, Uv, θv . We prepare a second RL
examiner with exactly the same setup, but samples in the or-
der rv, Av, Uv, θv,Γl,Γo, rl, Al, Ul. Fig. 6 shows the t-SNE
visualization of the last 50 examples given by the two RL
examiners (T = 500). Obviously they have converged to the
(a)
Γl,Γo, rl, Al, Ul, rv, Av, Uv, θv
(b)
rv, Av, Uv, θv,Γl,Γo, rl, Al, Ul
Figure 6: The last 50 lamp examples given by two RL exam-
iners with different order of factors.
same weaknesses, which is evidence that the RL examiner
is not sensitive to the order.
4.6 Identifying Model Strength
Finally, we show that instead of identifying model weakness,
the same setup can also be used to identify model strength,
simply by flipping the max in (2) to min. The examiner,
instead of trying to find the worst viewing condition of an
object, now tries to find the best viewing condition.
We show such a trial in Fig. 5. We indeed observe a curve
where the post-softmax probability on the true class goes up
throughout evaluation, which is symmetric to Fig. 1. The fi-
nal image reveals what the model considers to be the easiest
piano to recognize.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we advocate for a new testing paradigm for
machine learning models, where more emphasis is placed on
the worst case instead of reporting the average case perfor-
mance. To make this idea concrete, we propose adversarial
examiner, whose goal is to undermine the model’s perfor-
mance by discovering and concentrating on its weaknesses.
The adversarial examiner will dynamically hand out the next
testing data, based on the testing history so far. As a result,
different models will now be evaluated using potentially dif-
ferent samples from the input data space. We argue that this
notion can more effectively prevent hype, is closer in spirit
to human interview/Turing test, and can be especially im-
portant in sensitive domains such as autonomous driving and
medical applications.
We conduct experiments on visual recognition of
ShapeNet objects. Examiners based on Reinforcement
Learning and Bayesian Optimization both demonstrated
effectiveness in identifying the weaknesses of the target
model. However, our adversarial examination framework is
much more general than classification of rendered 3D ob-
jects. In the future, we hope to extend to other domains,
including image generation, language generation, and pose
estimation in robotics. Using the examples generated dur-
ing adversarial examination to improve training is another
potentially fruitful venue.
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